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Most of the spectacular victory in Desert Storm 1991 was caused by advanced technology that gave 
the operational planners means to conduct parallel warfare. It was a revolutionary warfare in all 
three dimensions simultaneously. The aim was to achieve rapid and decisive dominance and control 
of the adversary. Within the first one and a half hour over 50 separate high value targets was 
attacked by missiles and military aircrafts, as most of them was neutralized or destroyed. Within the 
first twenty four hours over 150 high value targets had been engaged all over the Iraqi territory and 
at all levels of command [tactical, operational, and strategic].
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The outcome of the Desert Storm chocked many of the top brass in the Russian Armed Forces. 
Ideas from Marshal Ogarkov and other military thinkers had predicted this new form of warfare. 
One of the most important conclusions of the Russian Revolution in Military Affairs during 1980’s 
was the impact of technology and science in the conduct of the new generation of warfare. The 
Russian feared the American application of precision weapons, communication technology, and the 
ability to conduct joint strike operations simultaneous in the joint operational area.
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The aim of this research paper is to study the Russian evolution of Warden’s Parallell Warfare and 
the Slipchenko’s Theory of Sixth Generation of Warfare.3 This paper will show how the focus on 
remote, stand-off and non-contact warfare conducted mainly by land, sea and air missiles is 
evolving to a Network-Centric Operations in Russia.
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 The integration of joint capabilities and 
combined tactical weapon is one of the main development areas that is described. Some of the 
tactical platforms have critical strategic capabilities, e.g., Iskander (SS-26), C-400/C-500 (SA-21 
Growler), and T-50 (Suchoj PAK FA). The other main development area is the impact of modern 
communication technologies and the importance to conduct information and psychological warfare. 
The purpose of these “new” methods and growing technological capabilities is to create operational 
and strategic synergy in the shaping of the operational environment and during the conduct of 
operations. The third main development area is the use of subversive elements in the depth of the 
adversary’s territory. Subversive elements could be influence agents, Special Forces, private 
mercenaries, or part of the adversary’s own population as a political and subversive force.5 
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The conclusions of the Russian Development of a New Generation of Warfare is that it has been an 
evolution from the Russian RMA in the 1980’s, combined with empirical knowledge of the 
execution of the “Parallell Warfare” in 1991. Mainly influence from Slipchenko theory of Sixth 
Generation Warfare, that was based much on modern precisions weapons, political-strategic targets, 
and communication-information technologies. The last ten years of evolution has mainly been in the 
intellectualizing of modern warfare. On how to use all available national resources in an effective 
way to create synergy on a national level, including the military and civilian part of the society, as 
well as on all command levels. The main Russian concept is to effect an adversary from the outside 
(by mainly missiles) and from the inside (by subversive operations inside the adversary’s territory) 
simultaneous. And as always Russia is said to have the highest priority to protect its own nation, as 
well as its own territory and people. The latest development of science and technology give us some 
thought about how much higher the capabilities, precision and effects could be today compared to 
the Parallel Warfare of 1991. Do we have concepts and perceptions to meet that threat and danger 
of today’s Russia?                  
